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JUSTIFYING SUBVERSION: WHY NUSSBAUM GOT (THE
BETTER INTERPRETATION OF) BUTLER WRONG
BY ORI J. HERSTEIN*
"If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes
certainty."
Ludwig Wittgenstein'
INTRODUCTION
One of the most common critiques directed at
deconstructive and poststructuralist theories is that they are
amoral - rejecting the validity of the very idea of norms and
moral principles as grounds for justifying or criticizing political
action and social structures - and that in rejecting the validity of
the distinction between what is just and what is unjust, they
"collaborate with evil."2 By now, an almost canonical example of
this common critique is found in Martha Nussbaum's highly
critical essay on the work of Judith Butler, titled The Professor of
Parody.3 Here, I focus on Nussbaum's critique and on Butler's
work as examples of the "common critique" and of deconstruction
and poststructuralism in political theory. I argue that the more
modest and sounder understanding of Butler - taken as a
deconstructive and poststructuralist theorist - is not susceptible
to these accusations of amorality and collaboration with evil.
Even if Butler's deconstructive poststructuralist theory
does not, as a matter of fact, justify adopting any deconstructive
agenda or subversive project of any specific political order, social
Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell University Law School.
For their comments on previous drafts of this article, I am grateful to
Leora Bilsky and Noa Ben-Asher. I am especially grateful to Katherine
Franke from whose seminar this article originated.
1 LuDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 115 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969).
2 Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, THE NEW REPUBLIc, Nov. 28,
2000, at 37, 45.
3 Id.
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practice, norm, or moral principle, it also does not necessarily
undermine the ideas of moral and normative justification of
specific acts of political deconstruction and subversion. According
to (what I take as) the better reading of Butler's theory and of
deconstructive theory in general, all subversion and
deconstruction inherently take place in relation to a relatively
stable set of background norms, structures of meaning,
descriptive assumptions, practices, and values. Such a
background is a necessary enabling condition for any act of
deconstruction and for the performance of any subversion or
parody; a background that may, and often does, comprise moral
values, norms, and principles that guide and justify specific
deconstructive and parodic actions. Therefore, while Butler's
theory, as an example of deconstructive and poststructuralist
approaches to politics, does not consist of any such norms, values,
or reasons justifying or rejecting any particular political action,
Butler's theory does not necessarily rule out grounding or
justifying the undertaking of a particular parody or
deconstructive agenda in value- or moral-driven practical
reasoning. Moreover, Butler's theory of subversion is
deconstructive at its core and as such, cannot be attributed with
making generalized propositions, including metaethical
propositions rejecting all principles of political morality. Hence,
Nussbaum's position - that Butler's theory entails an amoral
approach to political theory and action and therefore,
"collaborate[s] with evil" - is erroneous.
This essay begins with introducing Nussbaum's critique of
Butler's gender theory (Section 1); it then sets out to explore the
role moral justification plays in Butler's gender theory, which first
requires delving into Butler's work at some length (Section II).
Next, Butler's account of how the gender structure of identity and
social structures can be resisted and subverted is introduced
(Section III); in the end, the merits of Nussbaum's argument and
of the "common critique" turn on choosing between two
alternative interpretations of what poststructuralism is. The first
interpretation is labeled "universal poststructuralism," the
interpretation assumed by the common critique and in
Nussbaum's critique of Butler and of poststructuralism and
deconstruction in general. The second interpretation is labeled
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"contextual poststructuralism." This second version is not
susceptible to the common critique. This essay argues that the
"contextual reading" of Butler is better in tune with
poststructuralism and deconstruction in general, and that when
understood in its terms Butler's gender theory is not susceptible
to the common critique (Section IV).
I. NUSSBAUM'S CRITICISM OF BUTLER OR
THE "COMMON CRITIQUE"
In her essay, Nussbaum poses the following challenge:
Suppose we grant Butler . . . that the social
structure of gender is ubiquitous, but we can
resist it by subversive and parodic acts. Two
significant questions remain. What should be
resisted, and on what basis? What would the acts
of resistance be like, and what would we expect
them to accomplish?4
It is the first pair of questions that interests me here. In
the most general terms, when Nussbaum asks on what basis
Butler's theory allows to choose and justify acts of subversion
against what she calls the "ubiquitous social structure,"
Nussbaum is in fact doubting (and later denying) whether
poststructuralist theory allows for morally justifying or rejecting
any particular political action or agenda. According to Nussbaum,
"Butler cannot explain in any purely structural or procedural way
why the subversion of gender norms is a social good while the
subversion of justice norms is a social bad. '5
Nussbaum makes two arguments in support of her
criticism. First, she claims that as a matter of fact, Butler simply
does not attempt to justify the rightness of her political projects,
but simply assumes they are just. Examples of this absence of
moral justification can be found in the chapter on gay subversion
2010
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in Butler's Bodies That Matter.6 There, Butler seems not only
sympathetic towards subversion of the heterosexual-centric social
structure, but also positions herself as part of this subversive
political project. She does so with no effort at justification. The
same is true of Butler's discussion of the merits of gay marriage,
which is conducted on the basis of the assumption that gay
liberation should be promoted and persevered.7 Once again,
Butler does not explicitly mention these moral principles,
although one cannot but feel that they are presupposed in the
background as the obvious motivation for the project. Another
example is found in Butler's discussion of hate speech in her book
Excitable Speech, where she argues that censorship of hate speech
closes options for subversion, which are opened to the victim
group, taking this as a reason for opposing censorship. 8
Therefore, there seems to be some validity to Nussbaum's first
critique. Nevertheless, such examples only demonstrate that as a
matter of fact, Butler does not always justify her politics and
subversive agendas. They do not, however, prove that Butler's
theory inherently rejects the possibility of justifying or rejecting
certain acts of subversion, parody, and deconstruction as virtuous
or illegitimate.
Nussbaum's second argument in support of her critique is
categorical, yet underdeveloped. According to Nussbaum, Butler's
theory is adverse to the very idea of justifying political projects
because such justifications are based on principles and ideals that
are perceived to be good and serve as axioms for moral
justification. Examples of such ideals are human dignity, always
treating people also as ends and not only as means, basic human
needs, autonomy, and Nussbaum's own favorite core political
value, equality or respect. The reason Nussbaum attributes to
Butler's rejection of any such moral values and principles is that,
according to Nussbaum, Butler views them as "inherently
dictatorial."9
6 JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 121-42 (Routledge 1993) [hereinafter
BODIES].
7 Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual? 13.1 DIFFERENCES:
A J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 14 (2002).
B See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE
PERFORMATIVE 160 (Routledge 1997) [hereinafter EXCITABLE SPEECH].
9 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
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The common critique is not Nussbaum's only critique of
Butler. She also argues that the lack of ethical grounds in
Butler's writing has steered many feminists onto an amoral, non-
practical, aesthetic, and almost autistic path, away from
addressing actual, practical questions of gender injustice. In
addition, Nussbaum rails against Butler's style of writing, which
she views as sophistic and intentionally opaque. Nussbaum is
also highly critical of the mode of political action Butler's theory
allows for - parodic and symbolic subversion rather than material
change, which Nussbaum views as self-indulgent and of little
utility. All three critiques have at least some truth to them.
However, my concern here is only with that which I labeled the
"common critique" - that Butler's theory (and poststructuralism
and deconstructive theory in general) rules out any and all moral
justification for political action.
II. BUTLER'S THEORY OF GENDER CONSTRUCTION
In order to understand Nussbaum's position, it is
imperative to understand what she takes Butler's gender
theory to be. In Bodies That Matter, Butler lays out her theory
of how human bodies are always-already constructed into
categories of gender. In Excitable Speech, Butler makes a
similar point by arguing, based on Althusser's concept of
interpellation, 10 that we always-already exist as recognizable
subjects according to some ideology. "[0]ne comes to 'exist' by
virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the
Other. One exists not only by the virtue of being recognized
but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable.""
Since people are always-already constructed as such (as
people), it follows that there is no such thing as a natural or pre-
10 According to Althusser, people always exist as subjects of some ideology; we
are always-already interpellated by or into some ideology. We enter
ideologies through the process of interpellation, in which we accept the
ideological framework as true, or in other words perceive ourselves as
subjects of the ideology. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 87-126 (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 2001)
(1971).
11 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 160.
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social human essence. This is because before being constructed as
social]speaking (i.e. as symbolic beings, under Lacanian theory) or
interpellated beings (under an Althusserian approach), we were
not people. There is no natural (i.e. pre-social) state of
personhood, and therefore, there is no such thing as a human
body "belonging" to a person that is not already socially
constructed.
Furthermore, for Butler, human bodies are not only
always-already socialized, but are also similarly gendered
(through ongoing processes of performance). We never
encounter our body as ours (in the sense of being the body of a
person) prior to its being categorized as the body of a female or
a male. Moreover, we always encounter ourselves (as people)
as already-categorized by gender.
While in Excitable Speech Butler draws more on
Althusser's theory of ideology and interpellation to explain this
idea of being already-constituted, in Bodies That Matter, she
draws more on a Lacanian theory of child development. 12
Regardless of the psychological or sociological explanation, the
basic idea is the same - we exist always as already-constructed
beings. When a baby turns into a person, it does not transform
into a generic person, but is always transformed into either a
he or a she. In becoming a person, one is labeled as either male
or female through the intersection of the psychological dynamic
12 According to Lacan, a person or subject is not "born" at birth. At birth, a
baby is yet to be a person; it is only disjointed bodily and sensual sensations.
A baby begins to form into a person only after it internalizes the image of the
complete Other as its own (in the "mirror stage") and later by entering the
realm of the symbolic. Here, the baby becomes a subject by internalizing the
point of view of the Other, understanding the relation between itself and its
own reflection not as a sameness relation, but as a symbolic one, i.e., as that
of a signified and signifier. In this stage, the baby also internalizes the
structure of language: by searching for the approval that the image in the
mirror is really its own image, the baby internalizes the logic of language,
which requires the point of view of the Other to stabilize and ratify the
signifying relations. Jacques Lacan, The Mirror Stage, in ECRITS: A
SELECTION 3-9 (Bruce Fink and Alan Sheridan trans., W. W. Norton
Company Inc. 1977) (1966); SAMUEL WEBER, RETURN TO FREUD: JACQUES
LAcAN's DISLOCATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 7-19 (Michael Levine trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1991).
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of child development and the heterosexual structure of
kinship.13
Distinctions between bodies predicated on "sex" are
initially drawn on the basis of identifying a baby's reproductive
organs. However, this physiological based categorization is not as
neutral or natural as one may think. The category of "sex" does
not function like categorizing people by blood type. Being
ascribed a sex, i.e. being born "a boy" or "a girl," means being
ascribed a whole identity that is constructed by social norms and
which determines the course of one's life.
Furthermore, Butler points out that our gendered identity
is closely interrelated with sexual orientation identity. Being
ascribed a gender is interrelated with being ascribed one of the
two heterosexual roles. 14 According to Butler, being a "woman"
always means being a heterosexual woman. The idea of a lesbian
woman is adverse to the social construct of "woman"'15 - it is, in a
sense, unintelligible.
It is important to note that neither the identity
categorization nor the social meanings these identities entail are
up to us. We only exist, as the persons we are, after being
constituted and molded according to these categories, categories
that were molded prior to our birth by social norms we had no
hand in establishing. According to Butler,
Once "sex" itself is understood in its normativity,
the materiality of the body will not be thinkable
apart from the materialization of that regulatory
form. "Sex" is not simply what one has, or a
static description of what one is: it will be one of
the norms by which the "one" becomes viable at
all, that which qualifies a body for life within the
domain of cultural intelligibility.' 6
13 Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of
Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157-210 (Rayna R. Reiter ed.,
Monthly Review Press 1975). Butler seems to accept Rubin's kinship concept.
See, e.g., Butler, supra note 7.
14 Rubin, supra note 13.
15 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE xi-xiv (Routledge 1999) [hereinafter
GENDER TROUBLE].
16 BODIES, supra note 6, at 2.
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Elsewhere Butler explains that "[t]he terms that facilitate
recognition are themselves conventional, the effects and
instruments of a social ritual that decide, often through exclusion
and violence, the linguistic conditions of survivable objects."'17
This preexisting and controlling social structure is what
Nussbaum is referring to when she says that according to Butler,
"the social structure of gender is ubiquitous."'8  Assessing the
validity of Nussbaum's critique requires figuring out whether the
ubiquitous social structure of identity, as the idea emerges from
Butler's poststructuralist theory, allows for opposing, critiquing,
and resisting it "from within," and if so, does Butler's theory allow
for morally judging certain resistance and subversion as just and
others as wrong. Nussbaum, as a proponent of the common
critique, believes that such judgments and justifications are ruled
out by Butler's account of social construction. Nussbaum's error
derives from a mistaken understanding of Butler's
poststructuralist and deconstructive approach to the ubiquitous
social structure of gender.
III. RESISTING THE UBIQUITOUS STRUCTURE
"FROM WITHIN"
A. Resistance and the Ubiquitous Structure -
the Structuralist Account
One problem with all-inclusive structuralist theories is
that they lack both the ability to verify/criticize and justify/refute
themselves. According to the structuralist account of gender
construction, we all always-already exist within an all-embracing
and stable gender-constituting structure. From this, it follows
that any possibility of criticizing, or of even being aware of this
structure, is impossible. If we are constituted by and trapped
within this all-enveloping gender-constituting construct, which
professes to be neutral, natural, true, just, and essential, it must
follow that we (the would-be social critics) and our critical
faculties are also similarly constructed. Thus, how can we
critique such a system, let alone resist it?
17 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 5.
18 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
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Under such a closed all-inclusive structure, a constructed
identity is not unlike a Kantian transcendental category. One
cannot perceive beyond the structure for it constitutes not only
who one is, but also one's categories of perception and one's very
ability to perceive and categorize. Since we are always-already
constructed, we have no non-constructed point of view from which
we are free from our already constructed conceptual schema. In
gender terms, this entails that all we know and all we can know
are gender and the existing gender relations. Hence, a critical
theory claiming that gender is anything less than a
transcendental category (if not also natural, essential, and real) is
nonsense within such a ubiquitous schema. In addition, a critical
structuralist theory is epistemically impossible for the social
structure leaves no room for resisting or subverting it - neither
from the "outside" for the structure is ubiquitous, nor from the
"inside" for there is no space between our conceptual and critical
faculties and the ubiquitous gender structure allowing, enabling,
and setting the parameters for any critical reflection.
An example of a structuralist account in the field of gender
theory is found in the writing of Catharine MacKinnon, 19 who
argues that gender relations and gender itself are constructed
within a closed, self-justifying system in which men hold the
position of power and women are their objects of subordination.
This is a closed system of social construction in which all are
assigned a stable identity and none can escape it.
However, Butler is not a structuralist, but a post-
structuralist. This entails that although Butler accepts that
identity is always-already constructed (i.e., there is no
personhood outside or prior to structure since identity is only
intelligible in relation to and within a structure) and that
identity is subject to the Sausserean concept of meaning as
difference rather than to principles of inherent essence or self-
definition, 20 Butler does not accept the idea of an all-inclusive
19 For example, "men create the world from their own point of view, which
then becomes the truth to be described. This is a closed system, not anyone's
confusion." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7.3 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC'Y
537 (1982).
20 Ferdinand de Saussure claimed that the relation of the linguistic signifier
to its signified, i.e. the relation which constitutes meaning in language, is not
2010
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structure of meaning that is complete and entirely stable.
According to Butler, resistance of the ubiquitous social structure
is possible through identity subversion and parody.
B. Resistance and the Ubiquitous Structure - Butler's
Poststructuralist Account of Identity
1. Performance and Reiteration
For Butler, the construction of identity does not end with a
person's symbolic baptism (Lacan) or naming (Althusser), which
initiates our "birth" as people. According to Butler, "the rules that
constrain the intelligibility of the subject continue to structure the
subject throughout his or her life."21
However, the mere fact that the construction of our
identity is an ongoing project does not mean a person can
autonomously redefine his/her identity - that is a liberty we do
not have. Because the subject is always-already embedded, an
autonomous and self-defining subject is impossible since there is
no meaning or viable self outside or autonomous of the social
structure of meaning. Moreover, such an exercise in autonomy
determined by some special inherent relation of reference between the sign
and its signified. There is nothing essential or natural in the meanings
ascribed to different linguistic signs. Meaning in language is rather a
function of the relations between the various signifiers within the language.
Language is an array of signifiers and the relations of difference between
them. These differences between the signs are what determine their
meaning, i.e. each signifier is ascribed a signified according to the former's
place within the "web of signifiers." A linguistic sign outside the web of
difference relations is an oxymoron - in order for a sound or scribble to
become a signifier, it must be part of a structure of difference.
Under Saussure's account of language, there is a place within the
stable structure of meaning for supreme or privileged concepts upon which
other meanings are grounded. This is because in a web of differences, while
signifiers are assigned meaning on the basis of difference relations and not
due to any factors inherent to the signifier, meanings are still firmly
assigned. Thus, while Saussure's theory of meaning as difference seemingly
does away with the idea of a transcendent self-defining concept, it allows for
a stable structure with clear nexuses of "power," gravity, and centrality.
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally et
al. eds., Wade Bas trans., McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1959).
21 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 136.
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would be self-destructive for it would undermine the schema that
constitutes and gives meaning to one's own identity.22 Therefore,
attempts to subvert or reject the ongoing construction of one's
identity come with great personal danger.
If the subject speaks impossibly, speaks in ways
that cannot be regarded as speech or as the
speech of a subject, then that speech is discounted
and the viability of the subject called into
question. The consequences of such an irruption
of the unspeakable may range from a sense that
one is "falling apart" to the intervention of the
State to secure criminal or psychiatric
incarceration. 23
Throughout our lives, we constantly reaffirm our identity
by living according to our ascribed roles. Butler explains this
constant reconstitution as a product of a compulsive need to
reaffirm and stabilize our identity as natural or essential.24 For
example, gender identity is maintained and reinforced when we
speak in a gendered way and participate and follow gendered
institutions, practices, styles, norms of behavior, social activities,
ontological categories, etc., all of which we constantly perform.
This adherence to the gender matrix not only originates from the
risk to one's own intelligibility and the compulsion to affirm one's
own identity for fear of losing it, but also from the fact we are
constructed to believe that the gender structure is natural, true,
real, etc. In other words, "the anticipation of a gendered essence
produces that which it posits outside itself."25  Butler also
explains that the construction of identity is a temporal process,
made up of actual specific acts. Identity "construction is neither a
single act nor a causal process initiated by a subject and
22 1 am using figurative speech here in assuming a self that is prior to the
constituted subject. For Butler, there is no self who "owns" or "carries" its
socially constructed self.
23 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 136.
24 Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT:
LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 24 (Diana Fuss ed., Routledge 1991)
[hereinafter Imitation].
25 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note8, at xv (emphasis added).
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culminating in a set of fixed effects. Construction not only takes
place in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates
through the reiteration of norms."26
The temporal, specific, and performative nature of identity
construction is key to a poststructuralist approach to politics; it
entails that, in a sense, the social structure itself is not frozen and
stable as it is depicted under the structuralist account, but rather
it "lives" in time and in the particular acts of its performance. Put
differently, by acting according to our constructed identity roles,
we not only reconstruct our own identity, but are also recreating
the very social structure to which we are adhering. Moreover, we
adhere to the social structure because we believe (wrongly) it is
already "there" irrespective of our acceptance and performance of
it. Thus, according to Butler, by applying the language of gender
and thinking through the conceptual schema of gender, we are in
fact creating gender. Following John Austin's concept of
performative speech acts, Butler claims that by using the
language of the gender structure, we actually create not only
our own identity, but also the gender structure itself. Butler's
claim - that the existence of the gender structure is constituted
in its particular performances - derives from her
understanding of gender structure as a form of language, which
under deconstructive theory (as we shall soon see) exists only
as reiteration. The creation of identity through reiteration is
what Butler means by her theory of performance.
Building on her theory of performance, Butler suggests we
can also subvert the seemingly unbreakable self-recreating circle
of meaning and performance. According to her, "sex is both
produced and destabilized in the course of this reiteration....
This instability is the deconstituting possibility in the very
process of repetition.., the possibility to put the consolidation of
the norms of 'sex' into a potentially productive crisis."27
2. Iterability and the Instability of Structure
Butler explains how the subversion and destabilization of
the ubiquitous gender structure is possible by coupling her idea of
26 BODIES, supra note 6, at 10.
27 Id.
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gender performance as speech act with a deconstructive notion of
language as reiteration.
Jacques Derrida accounts for the role of iterability in
language through the metaphor of the signature.28 The concept of
a signature demands it be iterable, in other words for a signature
to "work" (i.e., to be a signature as opposed to merely a scribble of
someone's name), it must be a duplication of the original
Signature. What makes a scribble into a signature is the fact that
it is a reiteration of what we already know as The Signature.
People cannot sign their names completely differently every time;
if they did, they would just be writing out their names, not
signing it. However, in practice we never encounter The
Signature; all we encounter are specific occurrences of "it" (i.e.,
actual signatures).29 Hence, while a scribble is only a signature if
it is a reiteration of The Signature, in actuality, we can never
point to or signify the original (i.e., The Signature), because the
original categorically precedes even the first time we sign our
names. Therefore, we are always left with a copy, which entails
that the original only exists in its concrete duplications. In other
words, we are reiterating an original that is never "there."30
According to Derrida, language follows a similar logic to
that of a signature. When we use language, we do not invent it as
we go along. The concept of language necessarily entails that the
words we use already have meaning. Language does not erupt
spontaneously from the speaking subject; it necessarily has a
history and a structure of meaning that is independent of the
speaking subject. However, while the concept of language
demands it have a "sourced' component that can be reiterated, we
never encounter (in language) the original source of meaning we
are reiterating. Any attempt to express The Language or to
capture The Meaning or The Signified of specific signs is doomed
to fail. Any such attempt will always only be a particular
28 JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 31-34 (Samuel Weber trans.,
Northwestern Univ. Press 1988) (1977).
29 Even when we sign our name for the first time, that signature can only be
a signature if it too is a reiteration of some nonconcrete original. If we do not
take it to be a first concretization of some original, it cannot be regarded as a
signature.
30 See GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xv (indicating that the metaphor of
'The Ritual" does similar work as the signature metaphor).
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reiteration, a signifier, and a token of the unattainable original
signified or type. We search for The Source, but can only
encounter 'The Source"; we aspire to The Meaning, The Signified,
or The Signature, but can only attain 'The Meaning," 'The
Signified," or 'The Signature." As Butler explains, "One speaks a
language that is never fully one's own, but that language only
persists through repeated occasions of that invocation. That
language gains its temporal life only in and through the
utterances that reinvoke and restructure the conditions of its own
possibility."31 Hence, language is always in limbo - in one sense,
it is a source of meaning that is drawn upon and reiterated in
specific language use ("One speaks a language that is never fully
one's own. . . ."), and in another sense, it exists only in particular
uses (iterations). Thus, while language is reiterable, it is also
nothing more than iteration.
Butler's theory of performance draws on Derrida's account
of language. When we reconstruct our identity through
performing and adhering to the language and the conceptual
schema of the social structure, we are in fact reiterating the social
structure. For example, when we act "like a woman," we are
acting like the model of The Woman embedded in the social
gender structure. We are acting as a token of an archetype.
However, similarly to how language only exists in its reiteration,
the gender structure we are reiterating only exists in our
particular performance of it. "[G]ender [as well as sexual
orientation] is a kind of imitation for which there is no original; in
fact, it is a kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the
original as an effect and consequence of the imitation itself."32
This type of performance is subject to Derrida's logic of the
signature. Just as we never encounter The Signified or The
Language as such, only 'The Signified" and 'The Language," we
never really encounter or fully reiterate the social structure or the
type of identities it comprises, only imitations.
The reason the concept of iterability is applicable to
gender performance is that, according to Butler, the process of
gendering takes place in language, in symbolism, and through our
gendered conceptual schema via which we attribute meanings to
31 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 140.
32 Imitation, supra note 24, at 21(emphasis omitted).
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the world. Hence, in "acting like," talking, and thinking in a
gendered way, we are performing a reiteration of something that
only exists in its iterations.
Furthermore, just as every actual signature is slightly
different from its other particular counterparts, so our acts of
performance are all slightly different from each other. In other
words, there is room for incremental differences and variety in
the reiterating activity. We are like a community of Santa Claus
impersonators: while all Santa Claus impersonators are different
individuals, they are still all Santa Claus impersonators, and it is
this relation of similarity that constitutes what the original Santa
Claus - who does not exist - "is."33 Thus, if a person acts or
speaks in a manner that transgresses this relation of sameness
and, therefore, is no longer identifiable as a reiteration (for
example, one cannot impersonate Santa Claus by dressing up to
look like a teapot), he/she in a sense falls "out of language" -
his/her identity as a Santa Claus impersonator dissolves, and
he/she will cease to "make sense" (as a Santa Claus). Losing one's
identity as a Santa Claus impersonator is not so tragic; in
contrast, however, totally discarding gender may not only cause
one to cease being a "he" or a "she," but, because the conception of
a human being is that of a gendered being, one also runs the risk
of becoming some "it," i.e., not fully human. Thus, the extent of
the space allowed for changing The Structure of identity through
performance is limited to the realm in which that performance is
still recognized as related to or as a variation of that structure.
What remains to be proven is how the poststructuralist
account succeeds where the structuralist account failed: how is
subverting the "ubiquitous social structure" possible if we are
always-already constructed by it and completely immersed in it?
3. Agencv
Butler claims that agency is a necessary component of
structure and identity construction because both depend, for their
33 A similarity that is perhaps best characterized by the Wittgensteinian
concept of a "family resemblance. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 65-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
Macmillan 1972) (1953).
2010
58 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY Vol. XVIII
existence or intelligibility, on being performed. 34 According to
Butler, the human subject is produced as an effect of the
performance/structure relation and therefore, there is no subject
prior to performance.35 Butler proposes that "agency begins
where sovereignty wanes. [One is free to act] to the extent that
he or she is constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a
linguistic field of enabling constraints from the outset."3 6 Our
agency is therefore a product of construction - under the
poststructuralist account of social structure, the human agent is
an inherent effect as well as the cause of any structure.
From this, it seems to follow that we are free to subvert
the social structure "from within" because the agent is the creator
of structure and as such, has the power to recreate or deconstruct
the social structure through its performance. However, according
to Butler, the extent of autonomy involved in this agency is highly
limited.
[Tihe agency denoted by the performativity of
"sex" will be directly counter to any notion of a
voluntarist subject who exists quite apart from
the regulatory norms which she/he opposes. The
paradox of subjectivation.., is precisely that the
subject who would resist such norms is itself
enabled, if not produced, by such norms.
Although this constitutive constraint does not
foreclose the possibility of agency, it does locate
agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory practice,
immanent to power, and not a relation of external
opposition to power. 37
Thus, while the social structure enables our agency, it also
sets its limits. In a sense, we are only free to perform the social
structure and norms into which we are already-interpellated.
Still, Butler points out that being constituted by a
discourse does not necessarily entail being fully determined by
34 Imitation, supra note 24, at 22-23.
35 Id. at 24.
36 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 16.
37 BODIES, supra note 6, at 15.
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that discourse. 38 Our agency is produced within the space
created between the structure and its performance. Within
this space, we are free to perform and reiterate the discourse of
the social structure in ways that may stray from their former
ideal discursive type. Such transformation and subversion is
possible so long as it is still identifiable as a reiteration of the
discourse. By employing this tactic of subversion, the agent
exposes the seemingly natural structure, concept, or identity
type as no more than an effect of our constructed
"anticipation."3 9 In this, subversion is an act of deconstruction,
deconstructing the elements of the social structure and of one's
own identity - it is the poststructuralist mode of political
resistance.
C. The (Political) Effects of Subversion - Deconstructing
Privileged Concepts
1. The Idea of a Privileged/Sovereign Concept
Structure, such as the structure of gender, most often
entails centers of power supporting and bolstering the structure.
While no structure of meaning is completely frozen and entirely
stable, structures always retain some degree of stability and inner
logic, which are bolstered and expressed in their privileged
concepts. The "privileged concepts" may take many forms,
depending on the nature of the structure. They may be a
principle, a constitution, a leader, a faith, God, the majority, etc.
38'"hat cogito is never fully of the cultural world that it negotiates, no matter the
narrowness of the ontological distance that separates that subject from its
cultural predicates." GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at 182 (emphasis
omitted). "[A]ll signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to
repeat; 'agency,' then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on
that repetition. If the rules governing signification not only restrict but
enable the assertion of alternative domains of cultural intelligibility, i.e. new
possibilities for gender that contest the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms,
then it is only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion
of identity becomes possible." Id. at 185 (emphasis omitted).
39 Similarly to how the anticipation of the one "standing before law" creates
the power of the law which bars his/her entrance, we create gender through
our belief in its being true and essential. Id. at xiv.
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For example, in political/legal constructs, the ruling concept is the
sovereign; in algebra, it is the axiom.
From within the structure, the privileged concept is
perceived as self-justifying and natural. It is fact, real, true,
transcendent, self-evident, self-defining, clear and distinct, and
celestial. Because of their assumed "autonomy" and self-
justifying nature, privileged concepts seem not to depend on the
structure they are imbedded in for their meaning, legitimacy, or
truth-value; rather, the opposite seems true - it is the structure
that depends on its core foundational concepts. Just as the
sovereign's authority precedes and trumps legal authority, the
privileged concepts precede the system of meaning. Hence, in
different structures, the "seat of power," "the throne," or in
Lacanian terms, the "place of the real '40 may be inhabited by a
different privileged self-justifying "concept" or entity. In any case,
they all embody a transcendence typical of a sovereign: both
preceding and embedded within the structure they "rule over."
2. Deconstructing the Privileged or Sovereign Concept
and Exposing Its Violence
In subversive performance, we make evident the
privileged concepts through becoming aware of their particularity,
temporality, contingency, replaceability, and the fact that their
legitimacy is not self-justifying, but dependent on their privileged
position within the structure in relation to other concepts -
similarly to how the meaning of a word is not essential to it but is
derived from the contingent web of relations of linguistic
differences.4'
40 According to Lacan, the place of "the real," which is formed in our psyche as
a resolution to the Oedipus complex, is essentially empty. We fill this empty
"place" with signs, which substitute and stand in the place of The Real,
tragically and hopelessly trying to be The Real. However, since the place of
The Real is empty and The Real unattainable, all that stands in "its" place
can only try to signify "it." Yet, because in effect nothing is signified or rather
it is the signification of "nothing," such substitutions always fail. JACQUES
LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Norton
1988) (1975).
41 An example is found in Butler's analysis of drag, which, according to her,
indicates that gender identity does not necessarily correspond to only one sex
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A common method of deconstruction is to expose the
constitutive dichotomy a particular structure is based on by
implementing a Hegelian Master-Slave-like analysis. The
deconstructionist demonstrates how the sovereign concept is not
self-defining, natural, or self-justifying, but rather dependent on a
Siamese-twin concept, which is set up as the negation or duplicate
of the privileged concepts. For example, Butler demonstrates how
the concept of heterosexuality derives its social status as natural,
primary, and legitimate not from anything inherent in
heterosexuality, but rather from its negation to homosexuality,
which is deemed unnatural, derivative, and deviant. This theory
of meaning, based on relations and difference rather than essence,
rejects the very idea of self-definition and the notion that a
transcendent, autonomous, self-justifying concept is possible.
By exposing such dichotomies through subversive
performance, we diffuse our constructed and compulsive
expectation that the structure and the identities it sets up have
some inner authority we must adhere to and emulate. For
example, Butler explains that because no sexual identity is
natural, homosexuality is positioned as a derivative and a deviant
copy of heterosexuality,42 thereby producing heterosexuality as
the natural sexual identity in relation to its marginalized
dichotomous concept "homosexuality." Through subversion, we
expose constructed identity to be "drag" or performance rather
than natural or essential; we learn that the production of some
identities as natural and original always comes at the expense of
others who are positioned/produced as deviant and derivative
identities.
The next step in the deconstructive method is exposing the
power and violence that artificially elevate one of the dichotomous
concepts to the status of a sovereign or privileged concept. This is
usually achieved through bringing the "slave concept" to the fore
and showing how the "sovereign concept" came to be thought of as
such through the marginalization, oppression, and delegitimation
and that all gendering is an act of "dressing up" according to some ideal. For
example, Butler argues that "[d]rag constitutes the mundane way in which
genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn and done; it implies that all
gendering is a kind of impersonation and approximation." Imitation, supra
note 24, at 21.
42 Id. at 17-21.
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of its dichotomous concept. It is shown that only through the
"erasing," "silencing," and delegitimizing of its dichotomous
concept can a concept be transformed into a sovereign concept,
regarded as natural, self-defining, original, and nonrelational. 43
If we accept this account of how "natural," "original," "self-
justifying," and "essential" concepts are produced, it follows that
the introduction of such privileged concepts into political theory -
often in the form of moral principles - will always also incorporate
violence and subordination. Accordingly, violence is always prior
and constitutive to any justificatory schema based on privileged
principles. Thus, principles of political morality, a type of
privileged principles, do not derive their force from any innate
essential morality, but from a pre-moral history of violence.
After understanding how resistance of the "ubiquitous
social structure" is possible via deconstructive subversion, it
remains to be seen whether Butler's schema of political action
through subversion allows for distinguishing and discriminating
between justifiable and non-justifiable subversive acts.
Nussbaum believes it cannot.
V. JUSTIFYING SUBVERSION
A. "Universal Poststructuralism" and
Nussbaum's Criticism
Nussbaum claims that Butler and Foucault reject moral
imperatives and principles because according to them, such
concepts are "inherently dictatorial."44 I take this to mean that,
in Nussbaum's opinion, poststructuralist theory such as Butler's
or Foucault's entails that all claims-based schemas of justification
are always derived from some hidden arbitrary power structure,
which acclaims one principle as innately true by marginalizing
another (without justification, for the very structure of
justification is predicate on the same type of violence - assuming
a privileged metric as the standard of justification). This is a
43 The deconstructive analysis is conceptual, not necessarily entailing an
actual historical process of subjugating one concept to the other.
44 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
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"universal" version of poststructuralism because it makes a
universal claim against all privileged concepts.
Nussbaum points out that while Butler may target her
deconstructive powers of subversion against truly unjust power
structures, "[o]thers . . . might engage in the subversive
performances of making fun of feminist remarks in class, or
ripping down the posters of the lesbian and gay law students'
association. These things happen. They are parodic and
subversive. Why, then, aren't they daring and good?" 45
Therefore, Nussbaum claims that
[tlhere is a void, then, at the heart of Butler's
notion of politics. This void can look liberating,
because the reader fills it implicitly with a
normative theory of human equality or dignity.
But let there be no mistake: for Butler, as for
Foucault, subversion is subversion, and it can in
principle go in any direction. 46
When Nussbaum claims that poststructuralist theory allows and
even promotes subversion in favor of any ideology, practice, or
group (be it good or evil) that is marginalized by (social) power,
she assumes a universal understanding of what poststructuralism
is.
Nussbaum argues that Butler can afford not to tackle the
fact that her philosophical program rejects moral justification
because she writes to an audience of like-minded people who
agree on what the social evils are, such as the mistreatment of
women and gays. In other words, the correlation that seems to
exist between poststructuralist practice and morally justified
political causes (e.g., the connection between Butler's theory and
feminism, which I hold to be motivated by some conception of
right) does not derive from her gender or deconstructive theory
itself. Moreover, Nussbaum seems to believe that an adherence
to political agendas contradicts deconstructive and
poststructuralist theory. Put differently, according to Nussbaum,
Butler is in fact a "confused moralist" who perceives herself as a
45 Id.
46 1d.
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postmodern poststructuralist of the "Nussbaumian" version
(rejecting all truth and condemning all power), while in fact she is
motivated by certain moral principles and a political agenda of
gender and gay justice. 47 And, therefore, Butler's practice is not
compatible with her own theory because "universal
poststructuralism" rejects any attempt at justification grounded
in principle or norm. It does not allow for morally justifying or
condemning any power structure or subversive act. For example,
the tactic of subversion is open to the oppressed racial minority,
as well as to the outlawed and socially ostracized neo-Nazi.
1. Aversion to Power
One possible answer in defense of poststructuralism from
the common critique is to argue that poststructuralism does in
fact contain a positive normative guiding principle after all - to be
adverse to power. Indeed, there is a seemingly implicit
assumption in poststructuralist rhetoric and certainly in its
deconstructive manifestations, that power should be challenged.
The "aversion to power" answer derives from a universal
understanding of poststructuralism, arguing that all (social,
political) power, i.e., any relegation of certain concepts, principles,
identities, etc. to other concepts, principles, and identities in the
name of the latter's value, self-justifying nature, autonomy, or
justness, is somehow bad.
However, the aversion to power answer suffers from the
same inner contradiction as does the confused moralist - if all
power is bad, should not this universal judgment also be rejected
or at least problematized? Is the aversion to all power not also an
assertion that purports to be innately true or just and hence,
must also be a product of some pre-ethical violence?
Thus, while there seems to be an underlying assumption
in deconstructive thought that power structures must be exposed
and the marginalized elements within such structures should be
47 Butler herself offers another motivation, which seems to derive from a moral
principle, when she writes: "If there is a positive normative task in Gender
Trouble, it is to insist upon the extension of this legitimacy to bodies that have
been regarded as false, unreal and unintelligible." GENDER TROUBLE, supra note
15, at xxiii.
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freed from their relegation, there is no room in the universal
version of poststructuralism for evaluating or differentiating just
power structures from unjust ones or even for justifying the
general principle of aversion to all power. Hence, those who
argue from morality or justice while using the poststructuralist
schema in its universal version are simply confused, for they are
not true ("universal") poststructuralists. I believe this is how
Nussbaum would explain the relation between Butler's theory
and Butler's political convictions. An account Butler herself has
later come to reject. 48
2. The Silent Answer - an Argument from
Inconmmensurability
Another possible answer to Nussbaum is to point out that
she is playing a game of "intellectual solitaire." The
poststructuralist and deconstructivist need not answer the moral
question - on what principle or value does poststructuralism and
deconstruction justify the rejection of moral principles and
values? The reason being that the question demands an answer
in terms of (moral) justification, the very criterion and activity
that is in contention. The only proper answer a poststructuralist
can offer Nussbaum is silence. Any attempt to answer Nussbaum
would necessarily require using absolutist categories and logic -
the framework set up by Nussbaum's criticism. Richard Rorty, in
a different context, expresses this point aptly:
If truths are really convenient fictions, what
about the truth of the claim that that is what
they are? Is that too a convenient fiction? ... I
think it is important that we who are accused of
relativism stop using the distinctions between
finding and making, discovery and invention,
objective and subjective.... We must repudiate
48 JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 207-27 (Routledge 2004) [hereinafter
UNDOING GENDER].
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the vocabulary our opponents use, and not let
them impose it upon us. 49
This insistence on incommensurability may be what
Butler is alluding to when she explains that while the aversion
from the constraining and violent effect of normativity may
lead many to "say that the opposition to violence must take
place in the name of the norm, a norm of nonviolence, a norm of
respect,"50 that is in fact not her position. The notion that
there must be some norm justifying her position imposes on
Butler a distinction she rejects - that between norm and fact.51
It is the very language or logic of justification Butler seems to
be rejecting.
I find the "silent answer" to the attempt to hold Butler's
theory to the requirement for justification only partially
satisfactory. In many ways, at least for me, this answer is just
as much a reason for rejecting Butler's theory as it is for
accepting it. A better answer, in my eyes, would focus on
rejecting the formulation of Butler's theory of political action
(as a poststructuralist and deconstructivist theory) in universal
terms, actively demonstrating why the common critique does
not land any real punches.
49 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE xviii (Penguin Books
1999). Jane Flax seems to be making a similar point in her work, The End of
Innocence: "Postmodernism is not a form of relativism because relativism
only takes on meaning as the partner of its binary opposite - universalism.
Relativists assume the lack of an absolute standard is significant: 'everything
is relative' because there is no one thing to measure all claims by. If the
hankering for an absolute universal standard were absent, 'relativism' would
lose its meaning and force." Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEMINISTS
THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 445, 452-53 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds.,
Routledge 1992).
50 UNDOING GENDER, supra note 48, at 206.
51 Id. See also GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xxi ("We may be tempted to
make the following distinction: a descriptive account of gender includes
considerations of what makes gender intelligible, an inquiry into its conditions of
possibility, whereas a normative account seeks to answer the question of which
expressions of gender are acceptable .... The question, however, of what
qualifies as 'gender' is itself already a question that attests to a pervasively
normative operation of power, a fugitive operation of 'what will be the case' under
the rubric of 'what is the case.').
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B. "Contextual Poststructuralism"
Poststructuralism does not necessarily entail a rejection
of all or any moral principles - a statement not contradicted by
the fact that poststructuralism allows for the deconstruction of
privileged principles. I will offer two arguments for why this is
the case. The first derives from the particularistic and
contextual nature of the deconstructive method/act. The
second maintains that under a deconstructive or
poststructuralist approach, privileged concepts have a
necessary enabling function for any deconstructive act or
subversive performance.
1. The Particularistic Nature of the Deconstructive and
Subversive Act
Conceptualizing poststructuralism in universal terms
ignores the temporal, local, and contextual nature of the
poststructuralist's arguments. When Butler deconstructs gender,
she is better understood as deconstructing "gender" - as it is
understood now, by a particular society, in a specific context, at a
certain time and place. Any act of subversion is, as we saw,
always a particular act performed in a context by some specific
individual within and in relation to some specific structure. The
same is true of Butler's critique of "normative judgments" as
indistinguishable from power-saturated descriptive accounts. 52
In relating to Butler a universal rejection of all normative
principles, all descriptive accounts, and all privileged concepts,
one is making the error of universalizing and decontextualizing
her deconstructive arguments. Butler's method of subversion as
political resistance does not entail problematizing moral and
normative principles, but rather "moral" and "normative
principles" - not gender, but rather "gender"53; not normativity, 54
but rather "normativity"; not human nature, but rather "human
nature."55 The "universal" version of poststructuralism is wrong.
Poststructuralist theory does not make universal claims, and
52 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15.
53 Id. at xxi.
54 UNDOING GENDER, supra note 48, at 206.
55 Id. at 222.
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poststructuralist theory does not reject all moral principles; at
best, it can only reject the idea of "all moral principles" as it is
understood in a specific context. While Butler is not always
sufficiently careful in clarifying the temporality and particularity
of her deconstructive assertions, the better reading of her theory
would insist on it.
One may also be tempted to erroneously deduce from the
fact that deconstruction theory entails that all privileged concepts
are potentially deconstructible that deconstruction theory also
entails that all such concepts are contingent (and therefore, not
really privileged). This is a false move. No particular act of
deconstruction makes universal assertions and therefore, cannot
be used as a basis for inducing a general claim. This would be a
move by a mind prone to universal reasoning and unattuned to
the contextual nature of the deconstructive act. And, even if we
assume a pervasive potential for deconstruction, all we would be
claiming is that all is potentially deconstructible.
Furthermore, as we learned from Butler's theory of
identity subversion, for a subversion to take place or exist, it must
take place in a particular subversive act. There is no ruling,
transcendent, pervasive, deconstructive logic outside concrete
deconstructing and subversive acts or performances. Therefore,
to conclude a general assertion, such as "all moral principles are a
product of amoral violence," from a theoretical potential for
deconstruction is a muddle. The subversion of a "privileged
concept" only takes place if it is indeed actually successfully
subverted. Mere potential for deconstruction will not do to reject,
destabilize, or subvert a privileged concept. Often one hears
proponents of deconstructive and poststructuralist approaches
dismiss outright any attempt at truth-talk, value-talk, etc. as
theological, naive, and violent. Often this is done out of an
instinctive suspicion towards privileged concepts as such, and is
not based on any careful, persuasive deconstructive or
genealogical argument. Those who demonstrate such tendencies
are guilty of falsely deducing, through generalizing logic, actuality
from potentiality; are often dogmatic; and by no means count as
performing deconstructive or subversive acts (at best, they are
unknowingly performing a parody of deconstructive acts). Even if
Nussbaum is correct and Butler, in certain places at least, views
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all moral principles as "inherently dictatorial,"56 the best version
of Butler's theory and of poststructuralism and deconstruction in
general does not.
To clarify, pointing out the contextual nature of Butler's
theory of subversion does not entail that Butler's arguments are
always compelling, only that when they are not, they are so not
because of the common critique. In deconstructing broad
foundational concepts such as "the political discourse of
modernity," the basic terms of which, according to Butler, "are all
tainted and that to use such terms is to reinvoke the contexts of
oppression,"57 Butler is not always convincing, but this is not due
to some metaethical defect in her reasoning.
2. Privileged Concepts and the Background of
Intelligibility
Subversive deconstructive acts are made possible by some
privileged principles and, therefore, such acts always allow for
principle-based judgments. Every subversive act and every
deconstructive move are necessarily diversions from an otherwise
relatively stable structure of meaning. We do not live within
deconstruction; no one can live according to Derrida's
"differance,"58 just as no one can be a subversion or a parody - we
can only perform subversive and parodic acts. If we were to
become the parody, "we" would become unintelligible. In other
words, the parodic dance on the margins, the subversive act, and
the deconstructive argument are only intelligible because they are
performed in relation to an otherwise stable background network
of meaning. Indeed, as we saw, in the case of identity subversion
one retains his/her relation of sameness to the identity-type that
is being subverted. Moreover, one never subverts one's entire
identity or conceptual schema, but only aspects of it. It is only
under such circumstances that subversion becomes intelligible.
Butler's whole theory of subversion turns on the idea of
subversion "from within," wherein rejecting (intentionally or not)
56 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
17 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 160.
58 JACQUEs DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 1-28 (Alan Bass trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 1982) (1972).
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one's entire identity or conceptual schema is meaningless. This is
due to the ubiquitous nature of the social structure and the fact
that we are always-already constructed by it. Hence, for their
very intelligibility and possibility, subversive acts are enabled by
a rich background that is relatively stable; a background that is
not only not problematized by the subversive act, but is enabled
and assumed by it.
The background of any deconstructive act or parody is
made up of what is held (assumed) to be true. One may be
tempted to argue that this background is also always potentially
prone to deconstruction and that it too must originate from a
social construction, etc. However, as I argued earlier (a) such
general or universal claims have no weight in deconstruction; (b)
such claims point only to a potential deconstructive move and do
not establish or constitute such a move; and most importantly, (c)
the deconstruction of any specific background or even of the idea
of "background" or "context" will always in itself presume a
(relatively stable) background of its own. This is inescapable.
Therefore, the poststructuralist (of the "contextual"
persuasion) can continue to wonder about and pass judgment on
the morality and immorality of specific subversions, power, and
violence, even in a world that has stopped believing in the
transcendent. Moral- and principle-based reflection and
judgment are not necessarily ruled out by poststructuralism and
deconstruction. Similarly to the rest of us, the moral principles
the poststructuralist would employ in her practical reasoning and
judgments would derive from the enabling background structure,
only a small part of which would and could be the object of the
deconstructive and subversive act that background itself enables.
The necessity of some stable background of meaning does
not entail that any specific privileged concept is essential to
subversion and deconstruction, only that the intelligibility of
deconstructive moves require some such concepts. Therefore,
moral and normative concepts do not have to be assumed in such
a background. But, when such moves are practical, as is political
subversion, the background concepts that enable such actions
must include some reasons for actions, and among the most
prominent of such reasons derive from moral principles and
norms. In fact, when "pushed to the wall," Butler herself has
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evoked certain moral norms for assessing and judging subversive
actions; norms that are very much in vein with liberal-
democratic-leftist ideology.59 Hence, while Butler's theory does
not necessarily require that the background enabling political
subversion comprise moral principles, her theory clearly allows
for it.
While Butler's theory necessarily allows for moral
principles or other privileged practical principles to direct our
political actions, it also entails that we must always be wary of
dogmatism. Constant self-scrutiny and critical reflection is
required. We must always be aware that our certainties -
enabling specific acts of parody, subversion, and deconstruction -
may be subject to flux and that what we once held to be true and
just may not be so today. While this does not mean that what we
hold to be just is necessarily arbitrary or coercive, it does mean
that the possibility exists.
CONCLUSION
I tried to defend Butler and, more generally,
poststructuralism and deconstruction from what I called the
"common critique," which claims that these theories are amoral
and collaborate with evil. I focused on Nussbaum's critique of
Butler as an example of the common critique and of a
deconstructive poststructuralist theory because, beyond being a
good example, Nussbaum's essay has gained a substantial
presence within a broad intellectual circle, often referred to as a
classic, effective, and accessible repudiation of what is sometimes
labeled "postmodern" thought.
I argued that the common critique is based on an
erroneous understanding of Butler's work (or of its better
interpretation) as well as of poststructuralism and deconstruction
theories in general. The better and more careful version of these
59 For example, in assessing the demand of the marginalized fascist for
rights, Butler points out that "[i]t cannot be a good thing to invoke rights or
entitlements to what one considers a 'livable life' if that very life is based on
racism or misogyny or violence or exclusion." UNDOING GENDER, supra note
48, at 224.
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theories does not rule out all principles, including principles of
political morality.
